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Abstract
We say that a noncooperative game is nonmonetized if the ranges of the utilities of
the players are posets. In this paper, we examine some nonmonetized
noncooperative games of which both the collection of strategies and the ranges of
the utilities for the players are posets. Then we carry the concept of generalized Nash
equilibriums of noncooperative games deﬁned in (Li in J. Nonlinear Anal. Forum
18:1-11, 2013; Li and Park in Br. J. Econ. Manag. Trade 4(1), 2014) to extended Nash
equilibriums of nonmonetized noncooperative games. By applying some ﬁxed point
theorems in posets and by using the order-preserving property of mappings, we
prove an existence theorem of extended Nash equilibriums for nonmonetized
noncooperative games.
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1 Introduction
In economic theory, social science, military science, or other ﬁelds, the outcomes of some
games may not be in a complete (totally) ordered set; that is, the utilities of the players
may not be represented by real-valued functions, which is diﬀerent from most noncoop-
erative games in game theory. We give an example below to more precisely demonstrate
our arguments.
Tanker-jet example Suppose that a military project industry produces a certain type of
tankers and a certain type of ﬁghter planes. An arbitrary considered outcome is a set of
tankers and ﬁghter planes produced by this industry. LetU be the collection of all possible
outcomes. Assume that the combat eﬀectiveness of the tankers and the ﬁghter planes is
not comparable. Denote an arbitrary element in U by (x, y) where x, y are the numbers of
tankers and ﬁghter planes in this outcome, respectively. Then, based on the incomparable
capability of the outcomes, the non-rational preference relation on U is deﬁned by
(x, y) (x, y) if and only if x ≥ x and y ≥ y, ∀(x, y), (x, y) ∈U .
© 2013 Xie et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribu-
tion License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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This preference relation  on U is not a complete order, which is a partial order on U .
In case the budget of this military industry is limited (this is always true in the real world),
the decision makers of this industry would seek the war production plan to optimize the
ﬁghting capability under some given warfare environment.
It is clear that such an optimization problem is not a normal optimization problem (with
real-valued functions). As a matter of fact, these optimization ideas, introduced and stud-
ied byGiannessi [] in , are called vector optimization problems and vector variational
inequalities, where the outcome space is in a ﬁnite-dimensional vector space. Since then,
the theory as well as algorithms of vector variational inequalities and vector optimization
have been extensively studied. See, e.g., [–] and the references therein.
Understanding the existence of optimization problems with respect to a partial order
on a set of objectsU is of considerable interest for Li [], Li and Park [] to introduce the
concepts of the generalized Nash equilibrium of nonmonetized noncooperative games, in
which the utilities of the players may not be real-valued; that is, the payoﬀs of the players
may not be represented by real-valued functions. Nowwe recall the concept of generalized
Nash equilibrium of nonmonetized noncooperative games from [, ].
In an n-person nonmonetized noncooperative game  = (N ,S,P,U), where (U ,U ) is
a lattice, a selection of strategies (x¯, x¯, . . . , x¯n) ∈ S × S × · · · × Sn is called a generalized
Nash equilibrium of this game if the following order inequality holds:
Pi(xi, x¯–i)U Pi(x¯i, x¯–i), ∀xi ∈ Si and for every i = , , , . . . ,n. (i)
Existence theorems of generalized Nash equilibriums of some nonmonetized noncoop-
erative games are provided in [, ]. In [] the space of outcomes is a Banach lattice,
and in [] it is just a lattice, which is not required to be equipped with neither topological
structure nor algebraic structure.
In this paper, we extend the concept of generalized Nash equilibrium to broader classes
as follows: a selection of strategies (x¯, x¯, . . . , x¯n) ∈ S × S × · · · × Sn is called an extended
Nash equilibriumof a nonmonetized noncooperative game = (N ,S,P,U) if the following
order inequality holds:
Pi(xi, x¯–i)U Pi(x¯i, x¯–i), ∀xi ∈ Si and for every i = , , , . . . ,n. (ii)
It is clear that in both pure mathematical theory and real applications the order inequal-
ity (ii) is more general than the order inequality (i). In Section , we prove an existence
theorem of extended Nash equilibriums of some nonmonetized noncooperative games.
2 Preliminaries
For the readers’ convenience, in this section, we recall some concepts and properties of
posets and lattices (see, e.g., [, –]). Here we closely follow the notations from [] and
[].
Let P = (P,) be a poset. An element u of P is called an upper bound of a subset A of P
if x  u for each x ∈ A. If u ∈ A, then u is called the greatest element of A and is denoted
by u = maxA. If the set of all upper bounds of A has the smallest element, we call it the
supremum of A and denote it by supA or ∨A. An element y is called a maximal element
of A if y ∈ A and if z ∈ A and y  z imply that y = z. A lower bound of A, the smallest
Xie et al. Fixed Point Theory and Applications 2013, 2013:235 Page 3 of 13
http://www.ﬁxedpointtheoryandapplications.com/content/2013/1/235
element minA of A, the inﬁmum of A, infA = ∧A and a minimal element of A can be
deﬁned similarly.
A poset P = (P,) is called a lattice if inf{x, y} and sup{x, y} exist for all x, y ∈ P. Deﬁne
inf{x, y} = x ∧ y and sup{x, y} = x ∨ y. A subset C of a poset P = (P,) is called a chain if
x y or y x for all x, y ∈ C.
Deﬁnition . A poset P = (P,) is said to be
(i) inductive if every chain in P has an upper bound in P;
(ii) inversely inductive if every chain in P has a lower bound in P;
(iii) bi-inductive whenever it is both inductive and inversely inductive.
Deﬁnition . A poset P = (P,) is said to be
(i) strongly inductive whenever for every chain C in P, the supremum of C, supC,
exists in P;
(ii) strongly inversely inductive whenever for every chain C in P, the inﬁmum of C,
infC, exists in P;
(iii) strongly bi-inductive whenever it is both strongly inductive and strongly inversely
inductive.
Extension of Zorn’s lemma Every bi-inductive poset has both maximal and minimal el-
ements.
Let P = (P,) be a poset. For any z,w ∈ P, we deﬁne the order intervals:
[z) = {x ∈ P : x z}, (w] = {x ∈ P : x w} and
[z,w] = [z)∩ (w] = {x ∈ P : z  x w}.
Given posets (X,X) and (U ,U ), we say that a mapping F : X → U\∅ is order increas-
ing upward if xX y in X and z ∈ F(x) imply that [z)∩F(y) is nonempty, that is, if xX y in
X and z ∈ F(x), then there is w ∈ F(y) such that z U w. The mapping F is order increasing
downward if x X y in X and w ∈ F(y) imply that (w] ∩ F(x) is nonempty. F is said to be
order increasing whenever F is both order increasing upward and downward.
As a special case, a single-valuedmapping F from a poset (X,X) to the poset (U ,U ) is
said to be order increasing whenever xX y implies F(x)U F(x). An increasing mapping
F : X →U is said to be strictly order increasing whenever x≺X y implies F(x)≺U F(x).
A nonempty subset A of a subset Y of a poset P = (P,) is said to be order com-
pact upward in Y if for every chain C of Y that has a supremum in P, the intersection⋂{[y) ∩ A : y ∈ C} is nonempty whenever [y) ∩ A is nonempty for every y ∈ C. The set A
is order compact downward in Y if for every chain C of Y that has the inﬁmum in P, the
intersection
⋂{(y]∩A : y ∈ C} is nonempty whenever (y]∩A is nonempty for every y ∈ C.
If A is both order compact upward and order compact downward in Y , then A is said to
be order compact in Y .
Let A be a subset of a poset P = (P,). An element c ∈ P is called a sup-center of A in
P if c ∨ x exists in P for each x ∈ A. If c ∧ x exists in P for each x ∈ A, then c is called an
inf-center of A in P. If c is both a sup-center and an inf-center of A in P, then c is called
an order center of A in P. In particular, if A = P, then c is simply called a sup-center or an
inf-center of P, respectively.
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Let A be a nonempty subset of a poset P = (P,). The set ocl(A) is the collection of all
possible supremums and inﬁmums of chains of A, which is called the order closure of A.
If A = ocl(A), then A is said to be order closed.
Remark . Every nonempty strongly bi-inductive subset of a poset P = (P,) is order
closed.
Now we recall a ﬁxed point theorem on posets from []. It will be used in the proof
of the existence of extended Nash equilibrium of nonmonetized noncooperative games in
Section .
Theorem. [, Theorem .] Let P = (P,) be a poset.Assume that a set-valuedmap-
ping F : P → P\∅ is order increasing, and that its values are order compact in F(P). If
chains of F(P) have supremums and inﬁmums (in P), and if ocl(F(P)) has a sup-center or
an inf-center in P, then F has minimal and maximal ﬁxed points.
3 Nonmonetized noncooperative games on posets
In the section of Introduction, we described themotivations to extend the noncooperative
games and the concept of generalized Nash equilibrium to nonmonetized noncoopera-
tive games. In this section, we give some deﬁnitions for these extensions, which are the
generalized notions of Nash equilibriums deﬁned and studied in games theory (see, e.g.,
[–]).
Deﬁnition . Let n be a positive integer greater than . An n-person nonmonetized non-
cooperative game consists of the following elements:
() the set of n players, which is denoted by N = {, , , . . . ,n};
() the collection of n strategy sets S = {S,S, . . . ,Sn}, for the n players respectively,
which is also written as S = S × S × · · · × Sn;
() the outcome space (U ;U ) that is a poset;
() the n utilities functions (payoﬀ mappings) P,P, . . . ,Pn, where Pi is the utility
function for player i that is a mapping from S × S × · · · × Sn to the poset (U ;U )
for i = , , , . . . ,n. We deﬁne P = {P,P, . . . ,Pn}.
This game is denoted by  = (N ,S,P,U).
In an n-person nonmonetized noncooperative game = (N ,S,P,U), when all the n play-
ers , , , . . . ,n simultaneously and independently choose their own strategies x,x, . . . ,xn
to play, where xi ∈ Si, for i = , , , . . . ,n, then player i will receive his utility (payoﬀ)
Pi(x,x, . . . ,xn) ∈ U . For any x = (x,x, . . . ,xn) ∈ S, and for every given i = , , , . . . ,n,
as usual, we deﬁne
x–i := (x,x, . . . ,xi–,xi+, . . . ,xn) and S–i := S × S × · · · × Si– × Si+ × · · · × Sn.
Then xi– ∈ Si– and x can be simply written as x = (xi,xi–). Moreover, we deﬁne
Pi(Si,x–i) =
{
Pi(ti,x–i) : ti ∈ Si
}
.
Now we extend the concept of Nash equilibrium of noncooperative games and gener-
alized Nash equilibrium of nonmonetized noncooperative games to the extended Nash
equilibrium of nonmonetized noncooperative games.
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Deﬁnition . In an n-person nonmonetized noncooperative game  = (N ,S,P,U), a se-
lection of strategies (x˜, x˜, . . . , x˜n) ∈ S × S × · · · × Sn is called an extended Nash equilib-
rium of this game if, for every i = , , , . . . ,n, the following order inequality holds:
Pi(xi, x˜–i)U Pi(x˜i, x˜–i), ∀xi ∈ Si.
Lemma . Let (Si,i) be a poset for every i = , , . . . ,n. Let S = S × S × · · · × Sn be
the Cartesian product space of S,S, . . . ,Sn, and let S be the coordinate partial order on
S induced by the partial orders i. That is, for any x, y ∈ S with x = (x,x, . . . ,xn) and
y = (y, y, . . . , yn),
xS y if and only if xi i yi, ∀i = , , . . . ,n.
Then (S,S) is a poset. Furthermore, if every (Si,i) is (strongly) inductive, then (S,S)
is also (strongly) inductive. If every (Si,i) is (strongly) bi-inductive, then (S,S) is also
(strongly) bi-inductive.
Proof The proof is straightforward and is omitted here. 
The following theorem is the main result of this paper. It provides some conditions for
the existence of the extended Nash equilibrium of nonmonetized noncooperative games.
Theorem . Let  = (N ,S,P,U) be an n-person nonmonetized noncooperative game. If
for every player i = , , , . . . ,n, his strategy set (Si,i) satisﬁes:
(i) (Si,i) is a strongly inversely inductive poset;
(ii) (Si,i) has a sup-center (or an inf-center simultaneously for all i);
and his utility function Pi satisﬁes the following conditions:
() Pi : S →U is (single-valued) order increasing with respect to the product order S ;
() for any ﬁxed x–i ∈ S–i, Pi(Si,x–i) is an inductive subset of (U ,U );
() for any ﬁxed x–i ∈ S–i, and for any u ∈ Pi(Si,x–i), the inverse image
{zi ∈ Si : Pi(zi,x–i) = u} is a strongly bi-inductive subset of Si;
() for any (xi,x–i), (yi, y–i) ∈ S satisfying (xi,x–i)S (yi, y–i), the maximal elements have
the following monotone properties:
(a) if Pi(zi,x–i) is a maximal element of Pi(Si,x–i), then there is wi ∈ Si with zi i wi
such that Pi(wi, y–i) is a maximal element of Pi(Si, y–i);
(b) if Pi(wi, y–i) is a maximal element of Pi(Si, y–i), then there is zi ∈ Si with zi i wi
such that Pi(zi,x–i) is a maximal element of Pi(Si,x–i).
Then this nonmonetized noncooperative game  has an extended Nash equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, this nonmonetized noncooperative game  has minimal and maximal (with re-
spect to the product lattice order S) extended Nash equilibriums.
Proof For every i = , , . . . ,n, since (Si,i) is a poset, then from Lemma ., (S,S) is also
a poset equipped with the product order S . For every ﬁxed i = , , , . . . ,n, deﬁne a set-
valued mapping Ti : S → Si\∅ by
Ti(x) =
{
zi ∈ Si : Pi(zi,x–i) is a maximal element of Pi(Si,x–i)
}
,
∀x = (x,x, . . . ,xn) ∈ S. ()
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From condition () of this theorem, for every ﬁxed element x–i ∈ S–i, Pi(Si,x–i) is an
inductive subset of U . Then, applying the extension of Zorn’s lemma, the range Pi(Si,x–i)
has amaximal element; and hence Ti(x) is a nonempty subset of Si. Furthermore, we claim
that
Ti(x) is a nonempty strongly bi-inductive subset of Si, ∀x = (x,x, . . . ,xn) ∈ S. ()
In fact, pick an arbitrary chain Ci = {zi : zi ∈ Ci} in Ti(x) ⊆ Si. Then the order increasing
property of Pi implies that {Pi(zi,x–i) : zi ∈ Ci} must be a chain in Pi(Si,x–i). On the other
hand, from (), {Pi(zi,x–i) : zi ∈ Ci} is a collection of some maximal elements of Pi(Si,x–i).
Its chain property implies that {Pi(zi,x–i) : zi ∈ Ci} must be a singleton. So, we can assume
Pi(zi,x–i) = u for all zi ∈ Ci and for some u ∈ (U ,U ). Then the set (chain) Ci is a subset of
the inverse image {ti ∈ Si : Pi(ti,x–i) = u}; that is,
Ci ⊆
{
ti ∈ Si : Pi(ti,x–i) = u
}
.
From condition (), {ti ∈ Si : Pi(ti,x–i) = u} is a strongly bi-inductive subset of Si. It implies
that the chainCi has both supremumand inﬁmum in the inverse image {ti ∈ Si : Pi(ti,x–i) =
u}, which is contained in Ti(x). They clearly are the supremum and inﬁmum of this chain
Ci in Ti(x), respectively. It proves claim ().
Deﬁne the productmapping T : S → S\∅ of the set-valuedmappings T,T, . . . , and Tn
by
T(x) = T(x)× T(x)× · · · × Tn(x), ∀x ∈ S.
From () and applying Lemma ., we obtain thatT(x) is a nonempty strongly bi-inductive
subset of (S,U ) for every x = (x,x, . . . ,xn) ∈ S.
In order to apply Theorem . in [] to show the existence of a ﬁxed point for this
mapping T : S → S\∅, we have to show that the set-valued mapping T is increasing, that
its values are order compact in T(S), that chains of T(S) have supremums and inﬁmums,
and that ocl(T(S)) has a sup-center or an inf-center in S.
Now we show that T : S → S is an order increasing set-valued mapping with respect
to the product lattice order S . At ﬁrst, we prove the order increasing upward property
for T . For any given x, y ∈ S, with x S y, and for any given z ∈ T(x), we need to show
that there is w ∈ T(y) such that z S w. We write z = (z, z, . . . , zn). The deﬁnition of the
product mapping T and the hypothesis z ∈ T(x) imply zi ∈ Ti(x); that is,
Pi(zi,x–i) is a maximal element of Pi(Si,x–i) for every i = , , . . . ,n.
Applying part (a) in condition () of this theorem, and from (xi,x–i) S (yi, y–i), there is
wi ∈ Si such that
wi i zi for i = , , , . . . ,n, ()
and Pi(wi, y–i) is a maximal element of Pi(Si, y–i); that is,
wi ∈ Ti(y) for i = , , , . . . ,n. ()
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Let w = (w,w, . . . ,wn). By combining () and (), we obtain z S w andw ∈ T(y). It proves
that T is an order increasing upward mapping on S.
Secondly, we prove the order increasing downward property for T . For any given x, y ∈
S, with x S y, and for any w ∈ T(y), we need to show that there is z ∈ T(x) such that
z S w. Write w = (w,w, . . . ,wn). The hypothesis w ∈ T(y) implies wi ∈ Ti(y) for every
i = , , . . . ,n. That is, Pi(wi, y–i) is a maximal element of Pi(Si, y–i). Applying part (b) of
condition () of this theorem, and from (wi,x–i)S (wi, y–i) that is implied by the condition
x S y, we obtain that Pi(wi,x–i) is a maximal element of Pi(Si,x–i); that is, wi ∈ Ti(x).
Notice wi i wi for every i = , , . . . ,n. It implies w ∈ T(x); and hence T is order increasing
downward. Thus T is an order increasing set-valued mapping.
Next we show that T : S → S has order compact values in T(S). That is, we need to show
that for every x ∈ S, T(x) is both order compact upward and order compact downward in
T(S). At ﬁrst we show the order compact upward property of the values of T . Take an
arbitrary chain C in T(S) that has a supremum in S, which satisﬁes that
[y)∩ T(x) = ∅ for every y ∈ C. ()
(Note that the condition that the given chain C in T(S) has a supremum in S is not used
in the following proof of the order compact upward property of the values of T .) Deﬁne
y = (y, y, . . . , yn). Then
[y)∩ T(x) = ([y)∩ T(x), [y)∩ T(x), . . . , [yn)∩ Tn(x)
)
. ()
Since C is a chain in T(S) (which has a supremum in S), the set {yi : y ∈ C} is a chain in
Ti(S) (and it also has a supremum in Si). Hypothesis () and equality () imply
[yi)∩ Ti(x) = ∅ for every i = , , , . . . ,n and for every y ∈ C. ()
From inequality () we obtain that for every ﬁxed i = , , , . . . ,n and for every ﬁxed y ∈ C,
there is μ(yi) ∈ Si satisfying
μ(yi) ∈ Ti(x)⊆ Si and yi i μ(yi). ()
(Where μ can be considered as a function of two variables y and i deﬁned on C × N
satisfying μ : {y}×N → S for every ﬁxed y ∈ C and μ : C×{i} → Si for every ﬁxed i ∈N .)
So, for every ﬁxed i, when y varies in the chain C, from () we obtain a subset {μ(yi) : y ∈
C} ⊆ Ti(x) ⊆ Si that is a chain in Ti(x). From (), since Ti(x) is strongly bi-inductive and
order closed, the chain {μ(yi) : y ∈ C} in Ti(x) has its supremum and inﬁmum in Ti(x). Let
the supremum of {μ(yi) : y ∈ C} be denoted by
qi =
∨{
μ(yi) : y ∈ C
} ∈ Ti(x) for every ﬁxed i = , , , . . . ,n. ()
(Note: After taking the supremum operator with respect to y ∈ C, qi only depends on i,
and it does not depend on y in C.) By combining () and (), for every ﬁxed i = , , , . . . ,n,
we have
yi i qi and qi ∈ Ti(x) for all y ∈ C,





[yi)∩ Ti(x) : y ∈ C
}
for every ﬁxed i = , , , . . . ,n. ()
Let q = (q,q, . . . ,qn). From () and (), we obtain q ∈⋂{[y)∩ T(x) : y ∈ C}. That is,
⋂{
[y)∩ T(x) : y ∈ C} = ∅.
Hence, T(x) is order compact upward in T(S).
By the strongly bi-inductive property (), very similarly to the above proof, we can show
that for every x ∈ S,T(x) is order compact downward inT(S). HenceT(x) is order compact
in T(S).
From (), we see that for every x ∈ S, T(x) is a strongly bi-inductive subset of S. Then we
show that T(S) is a strongly bi-inductive subset of S. It is equivalent to that every chain of





zλ , zλ, . . . , zλn
)
: λ ∈ }⊆ T(S)
is a chain in T(S) with index set . Take a ﬁxed γ ∈ ; that is, a ﬁxed zγ ∈ C, there is
xγ = (xγ ,x
γ
 , . . . ,x
γ
n ) ∈ S such that zγ ∈ T(xγ ) = T(xγ ) × T(xγ ) × · · · × Tn(xγ ). Then, for












For any zλ ∈ C with zλ S zγ , we have zλi i zγi , that implies (zλi ,xγ–i) S (zγi ,xγ–i) for i =












for i = , , , . . . ,n. ()
Combining () and (), and from zλi ∈ Si, we obtain Pi(zλi ,xγ–i) = Pi(zγi ,xγ–i), which is a
maximal element of Pi(Si,xγ–i) which implies that zλ ∈ C with zλ S zγ . Then we have zλi ∈
Ti(xγ ); and therefore
{





for every ﬁxed i = , , . . . ,n.
Since C is a chain in T(S), it clearly implies that {zλi : zλ ∈ C and zλ S zγ } is a chain in
Ti(xγ ). From (), this chain {zλi : zλ ∈ C and zλ S zγ } in Ti(xγ ) has its supremum in Ti(xγ ).
Hence
∨{zλi : zλ ∈ C and zλ S zγ } exists and it is in Ti(xγ ), which is denoted by
νi =
∨{






Let ν = (ν,ν, . . . ,νn). Then the ﬁrst part of () implies ν =
∨{zλ ∈ C : zλ S zγ }. Since
C is a chain, and notice zλ ∈ C, it yields that
ν =
∨{
zλ ∈ C : zλ S zγ } =
∨{
zλ ∈ C}.
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Hence ν is the supremumof this chainC in S. (Furthermore, the second part of () implies
that ν ∈ T(xγ ), that is, the supremum of this chain C in T(S) is in T(S).)
On the other hand, for the given chain C = {zλ = (zλ , zλ, . . . , zλn) : λ ∈ } ⊆ T(S), we rec-
ognize that {zλi : zλ ∈ C} is a chain in Si. The inversely inductive property of Si given in con-




zλi : zλ ∈ C
}
,
exists and is in Si. Let b = (b,b, . . . ,bn). From the above deﬁnition, b is the inﬁmum of
this chain C in S. Hence, for any arbitrary chain C in T(S), both supC and infC exist in S.
Finally, from condition (ii) of this theorem, suppose that Si has an inf-center for every
i = , , . . . ,n. Let ci be an inf-center of Si for every i = , , . . . ,n, and let c = (c, c, . . . , cn).
It is clear that c is an inf-center of S. So, c is an inf-center of ocl(T(S)) in S. Thus the
mapping T : S → S\∅ satisﬁes all the conditions of Theorem .. Hence T has a ﬁxed
point x˜ = (x˜, x˜, . . . , x˜n) which satisﬁes x˜ ∈ T(x˜). It implies x˜i ∈ Ti(x˜); that is,
Pi(x˜i, x˜–i) is a maximal element of Pi(Si, x˜–i) for every ﬁxed i = , , . . . ,n.
It is equivalent to that for every i = , , , . . . ,n, we have
Pi(ti, x˜–i)U Pi(x˜i, x˜–i) for all ti ∈ Si,
which shows that x˜ = (x˜, x˜, . . . , x˜n) is an extendedNash equilibrium of this game. Further-
more, from Theorem ., the mapping T has minimal and maximal ﬁxed points. Based
on the above argument, they are the minimal and maximal (with respect to the product
lattice order S) extended Nash equilibriums for this game. This completes the proof of
this theorem. 
4 Nonmonetized noncooperative games on lattices
In this section, we consider a special case of nonmonetized noncooperative games, deﬁned
in Deﬁnition . in the last section, for the outcome space and strategy sets to be lattices.
Then we examine that the generalized Nash equilibriums of nonmonetized noncooper-
ative games deﬁned in [, ] are the special cases of the extended Nash equilibriums
deﬁned in Deﬁnition ..
Deﬁnition . [, Deﬁnition .] In an n-person nonmonetized noncooperative game
 = (N ,S,P,U), with (U ,U ) to be a lattice, a selection of strategies (x¯, x¯, . . . , x¯n) ∈ S ×
S × · · · × Sn is called a generalized Nash equilibrium of this game if the following order
inequality holds
Pi(xi, x¯–i)U Pi(x¯i, x¯–i)
for all xi ∈ Si and for every i = , , , . . . ,n.
It is clear that any generalized Nash equilibrium of a nonmonetized noncooperative
game is an extended Nash equilibrium of this game. The converse may not be true. We
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show below that Theorem . in [] about the existence of generalized Nash equilibrium
can be obtained as a corollary of Theorem . in this paper.
Corollary . [, Theorem .] Let  = (N ,S,P,U) be an n-person nonmonetized nonco-
operative game, with (U ,U ) to be a lattice. If for every player i = , , , . . . ,n, his strategy
set (Si,i) is a strongly inversely inductive lattice and his utility function Pi satisﬁes the
following conditions:
() Pi : S →U is (single-valued) order increasing with respect to the product order S ;
() for any ﬁxed x–i ∈ S–i, Pi(Si,x–i) is an order bounded and Dedekind complete subset
of (U ,U );
() for any ﬁxed x–i ∈ S–i, and for any u ∈ Pi(Si,x–i), the inverse image
{zi ∈ Si : Pi(zi,x–i) = u} is an order bounded and Dedekind complete subset of Si;
() if (wi,x–i)S (wi, y–i), then for any u ∈ Pi(Si,x–i)∩ (Pi(wi, y–i)], there is zi ∈ Si such
that zi i wi and Pi(zi,x–i) = u.
Then this nonmonetized noncooperative game  has a generalized Nash equilibrium. Fur-
thermore,  has minimal and maximal (with respect to the product lattice order S) gen-
eralized Nash equilibriums.
Proof One can see that any order bounded Dedekind complete subset of a lattice is a
strongly bi-inductive subset of this lattice. Hence conditions () and () in this corol-
lary imply conditions () and () in Theorem .. Next, we show that conditions ()-()
in this corollary imply condition () in Theorem .. As a matter of fact, under con-
dition () in this corollary, we have that Pi(wi, y–i) is a maximal element of Pi(Si, y–i) if
and only if Pi(wi, y–i) =
∨
ti∈Si Pi(ti, y–i). Suppose (wi,x–i) S (wi, y–i). From condition (),






Pi(ti, y–i) = Pi(wi, y–i). ()
Since Pi(Si,x–i) is order bounded Dedekind complete, we have
∨
ti∈Si
Pi(ti,x–i) ∈ Pi(Si,x–i). ()








From condition () in this corollary, there is zi ∈ Si such that zi i wi and Pi(zi,x–i) =∨
ti∈Si Pi(ti,x–i). By applying the order increasing property of Pi, we have Pi(wi,x–i) S
Pi(zi,x–i) =
∨





So, Pi(wi,x–i) is also the supremum of Pi(Si,x–i) in Pi(Si,x–i), which is the unique maximal
element of Pi(Si,x–i). Taking zi = wi, then part (b) of condition () in Theorem . holds.
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To show that part (a) of condition () in Theorem . holds, for any given x, y ∈ S,
with x S y, and for any given zi ∈ Si such that Pi(zi,x–i) is the supremum of Pi(Si,x–i)




Pi(ti,x–i) for every i = , , . . . ,n.
For any ﬁxed ti ∈ Si, the condition x S y clearly implies (ti,x–i) S (ti, y–i). Then, from
condition () of this corollary, we obtain








From condition () of this corollary again, the range Pi(Si, y–i) is an order bounded and





Let wi = zi ∨ ai ∈ Si. Then wi satisﬁes
wi i zi and wi i ai for i = , , , . . . ,n.
The second order inequality above implies (wi, y–i)S (ai, y–i). The order-increasing prop-
erty of Pi : S →U implies




Since wi = zi ∨ ai ∈ Si, from the above order inequality, we get Pi(wi, y–i) =∨ti∈Si Pi(ti, y–i).
Hence Pi(wi, y–i) is the supremum of Pi(Si, y–i) in Pi(Si, y–i), which is the unique maximal
element of Pi(Si, y–i). It shows that part (a) of condition () in Theorem . holds. Hence
condition () in Theorem . is satisﬁed.
Condition (ii) for the set of strategies Si in Theorem . is satisﬁed. Every element of
Si is both a sup-center and an inf-center of Si. It is because (Si,i) is a strongly inversely
inductive lattice. So, condition (i) for the set of strategies Si in Theorem . is also satisﬁed.
Thus, from Theorem ., the game  = (N ,S,P,U) has an extended Nash equilibrium
(x¯, x¯, . . . , x¯n) ∈ S × S × · · · × Sn satisfying that for every i = , , , . . . ,n, the following
order inequality holds:
Pi(xi, x¯–i)U Pi(x¯i, x¯–i) for all xi ∈ Si. ()
We claim that (x¯, x¯, . . . , x¯n) is a generalizedNash equilibriumof this game = (N ,S,P,U).
To show this claim, we need to prove that for every i = , , , . . . ,n, the following order
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inequality holds:
Pi(xi, x¯–i)U Pi(x¯i, x¯–i) for all xi ∈ Si.
To this end, assume, by the way of contradiction, that there is zi ∈ Si such that
Pi(zi, x¯–i)U Pi(x¯i, x¯–i). ()
Since Pi(Si, x¯–i) is an order bounded Dedekind complete sub-lattice of Si,
Pi(zi, x¯–i)∨ Pi(x¯i, x¯–i) ∈ Pi(Si, x¯–i).
Therefore, there is yi ∈ Si such that
Pi(yi, x¯–i) = Pi(zi, x¯–i)∨ Pi(x¯i, x¯–i). ()
From (), the supremum in () implies
Pi(yi, x¯–i)U Pi(x¯i, x¯–i).
It is a contradiction to () and this corollary is proved. 
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